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The basic assumption of this paper is that mathematics and history of mathematics are both forms of knowledge and, therefore, represent different ways of knowing. This was also the basic assumption of Fried (2001) who maintained that these ways of knowing imply different conceptual and methodological commitments, which, in turn, lead to a conflict between the commitments of mathematics education and history of mathematics. But that conclusion was far too peremptory. The present paper, by contrast, takes the position, relying in part on Saussurean semiotics, that the historian's and working mathematician's ways of knowing are complementary. Recognizing this fact, it is argued, brings us to a deeper understanding of ourselves as creatures that do mathematics. This understanding, which is a kind of mathematical self-knowledge, is then proposed as an alternative commitment for mathematics education. In light of that commitment, history of mathematics assumes an essential role in mathematics education both as a subject and as a mediator between the aforementioned ways of knowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of a broader study that draws on Wenger's (Wenger, E.: 1998, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity, Cambridge University Press, New Work) social practice perspective to investigate teacher learning. The study extends Wenger's complex model of interrelated components of leaning (as meaning, practice, identity and community) to describe and explain teacher learning that occurs within a mathematics senior-phase in-service program that was stimulated by curriculum change. The study uses qualitative ethnography in which the researcher performs the dual role of both coordinator and researcher of the in-service practice. In a longitudinal study the phenomenon of confidence emerged in teachers' descriptions and explanations of their learning. In this paper I explore this phenomenon both empirically and theoretically. The extension of Wenger's (1998) theory to include the overarching and interacting component of confidence is embedded in and derived from data analysis of 10 teachers' learning, over a 2-year period, during a time of radical curriculum change. Since it would be incoherent within this framework to draw on psychological explanations of confidence I set out to explore confidence from within a social practice frame in a way that is grounded in data of the teachers in this study. The paper offers a concept of confidence in relation to teacher learning as 'learning as mastery', and confidence as both a product and a process of learning. Teachers can at once state their confidence as mathematics teachers, and their confidence to admit to what they do not know and still need to learn. It is argued that this is a primary condition for ongoing learning in a profession like mathematics teaching. In addition, the paper provides a critique of the applicability of Wenger's work to the context of teacher education and in particular highlights the absence of the notion of confidence within his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we describe learners being asked to generate examples of new mathematical concepts, thus developing and exploring example spaces. First we elaborate the theoretical background for learner generated examples (LGEs) in learning new concepts. The data we then present provides evidence of the possibility of learning new concepts through a symbiosis of induction and abduction from experience and deduction from the relationships generated in exemplification. In other words, experience can be organised in such a way that shifts of understanding take place as a result of learners’ own actions. Actions, in this context, include mental acts of organisational reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the possibility of differentiating between two types of nonexamples. The first type, intuitive nonexamples, consists of nonexamples which are intuitively accepted as such. That is, children immediately identify them as nonexamples. The second type, non-intuitive nonexamples, consists of nonexamples that bear a significant similarity to valid examples of the concept, and consequently are more often mistakenly identified as examples. We describe and discuss these notions and present a study regarding kindergarten children’s grasp of nonexamples of triangles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]