1. Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War.
- Author
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Weinberger, Seth
- Subjects
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INTERNATIONAL relations , *INTERNATIONAL cooperation , *ANARCHISM , *COLD War, 1945-1991 , *NUCLEAR weapons , *COMMUNISM - Abstract
Paper Proposal for the 2004 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association States trapped in the security dilemma of international politics need mechanisms by which they can credibly and clearly transmit their preferences to one another. Whether a state is trying to issue a deterrent threat or convince another state that it is trustworthy and can be counted on to cooperate, every state needs some way to communicate with other states. However, in an anarchic system with no means of contractual enforcement, it is the receiving and interpreting of signals of intention that becomes difficult. When signals lack cost, they also lack meaning, as deception becomes easy. But, attaching cost to international signals is not an easy task, especially when the signal is intended to convey a state’s fundamental preferences, or type, to others. International institutions can serve a valuable role in this problem, as they have a unique ability to impose costs upon states. Many institutional structures involve differing levels of costs, as a result of compliance with the institutional requirements or from the internalization of new norms. Additionally, institutions can create standards of behavior against which the actions of a state can be judged. Institutions may be able to send more credible signals of preference, because they reveal and affect the very nature of the state: its domestic structures, political arrangements, and intentions. Due to the ability of institutions to internalize their values within member states, a state that is aware of the likely costs of an institution will only accede to those institutions that it perceives to be commensurate with its interest, while institutions that codify or internalize undesirable rules, obligations, and norms will be rejected, or entered into and not complied with. I hypothesize that hegemonic states use institutions in a variety of strategies to both send and evoke signals of state preference, in order to determine the type of other states and to reveal their own type in turn. Institutions may either be created whole cloth to see if another state will join, or adherence to existing rules can be used as the yardstick. Either way, institutional offers, in which one state uses institutional adherence or accession to judge another, help tie costs to actions, making the sending and receiving of costly signals possible. The paper I propose to present at the 2004 ISA annual meeting is drawn from my dissertation, which I am currently writing, and examines the way in which states draw assessments of the preferences of other states through institutional behavior. Specifically, my paper will look at origins of the Cold War immediately following the conclusion of World War II. By looking at several institutional offers ? including the creation of the United Nations, the Soviet occupation of Iran, which became the first issue brought before the UN, and the proposals for the Baruch Plan, intended to create an international organization to control nuclear technology and weapons ? I will demonstrate how policy makers within the United States shifted their opinions of Soviet preferences from viewing the USSR as a potential partner for peace and cooperation to seeing the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy bent on the expansion of Communism and world domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2004