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The study of international organizations has come a long way, from benign neglect in the past to a widespread recognition of their importance. This paper seeks to weave together two salient trends in the literature: Organizational aspects of IO’s, and their relation with international norms and ideas. It has been argued elsewhere that IO’s can enhance and facilitate the spread of new ideas by adopting them in their policies. There are good reasons to think this was the case with the World Bank’s state reform policies, which changed quite massively at the same time the ‘New Institutional Economics’ rose to prominence among practitioners and scholars of development. This paper will proceed in three steps. First, two models of change will be developed, each giving different emphasis to organizational factors. Second, the changing state reform strategies from the late 1980s until today will be documented. Third, we will analyze how new ideas were put into practice, if at all. What emerges is a complex picture of bottom-up and top-down changes inside a huge organizations, where often only ideas that fit emerging problems get promoted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do states cooperate to establish international organizations? This paper examines the creation of a particular type of international organization ? those that are intended to facilitate the development of third world countries and countries in transition. The 20th century has seen a steady rise in the number of and funding for intergovernmental organizations that promote development. However, little research exists on why states collaborate to form this type of inter-governmental institution in the first place. This paper addresses this gap, focusing on why states created development activities in the League of Nations. The League was the world’s first major multilateral development aid institution, set the stage for all future multilateral aid organizations, and represents the first glimpse into the overall growth of multilateral aid institutions. This paper suggests that, although economic and strategic concerns of founding member states partially explain the creation of this organization’s development activities, advocacy groups, domestic coaltions, and altruistic ideas are also essential explanatory factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an attempt to bridge the approaches of two fields of study - international relations and science and technology studies - in order to explore the nature of the science-policy interactions in global governance. It first reviews existing theorizations in the two fields on how scientific expertise is utilized in addressing issues and problems of global significance. The paper goes on to suggest future research topics for studying the use of scientific expertise in global governance - (i) organizational diversity of global scientific advisory bodies, (ii) tradeoffs among the attributes of effective global scientific advice, (iii) differential impacts of scientific input on different stages of global policymaking, (iv) accountability problem in the global context, and (v) degree of knowledge synthesis as opposed to knowledge generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of UN peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict countries has grown dramatically in recent years. However the politics of contributing peacekeeping forces to these UN operations still tends to be taken for granted. Where do peacekeepers come from, and what is the politics involved in countries contributing armed forces to the UN? These are some of the questions that this paper sets out to answer. As the global deployment of UN peacekeepers is now famously second only to that of American armed forces, understanding the dynamics of peacekeeping contribution has become a necessity. This paper sets out to understand UN peacekeeping contribution in the aggregate, and to understand the place of such contributions in the context of global governance. This paper also offers a critique of existing theories of peacekeeping contribution. The implications of these massive new deployments of military personnel are sketched out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tis paper discusses the role that the Catholic Church has played as a Global Governance institution before and after the Peace of Westphalia. Te Catholic Church is in the unusual situation of having been the sole worldly international institution to function as a de facto world government. Moreover, the system of modern sovereignty was constructed in direct opposition to the rule of the Church. Unlike other institutions one must explain how the Catholic Church has survived as an institution given the changes within the international order, as opposed to accounting for how it came into being in a system of competitive sovereign states. Tis paper employs Foucauldian ideas of governmentality and bio-power to understand the survival and performance of the Catholic Church as an international regime. I contend that the biopolitics employed is better understood as psychepower: the infuence of the Church goes beyond disciplining bodily and political behaviours and seeks to strike at something far more normative, ideological, and ideational than other international institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meaningful global governance is hardly possible without at least some consensus on the pattern of values that necessarily underpin existing international society. Although much discussion on global governance has often been reduced to "technical" problems, such as the analysis of possible solutions to identified collective problems, this paper argues that future theories of global governance need to be placed it in a broader framework of international society. Assuming there is an inherent conflict between values in any international society, who are the main dramatis personae? This discussion inevitably leads to the issue of the structure of international society considered in its empirical, legal and political dimensions. The important question is however, how this structure is related to the theoretical and paradigmatic framework of international law. Is contemporary international law prepared to accommodate the new agents of order. This paper, by providing insight into the structure of contemporary international society, explores the role of non-state actors and their relationship with international law and draws some conclusions as well as preliminary answers to these fundamental questions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper forms part of a research proposal looking at the politics of resistance and its links to the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm of world order. Even within critical theorising in International Relations there have often been only limited attempts to analyse the poor in a 'bottom-up' fashion. This paper seeks to use Robert W. Cox's and Jeffrey Harrod's (1987) concepts of 'patterns of social relations of production' and 'unprotected worker' as a vantage point to reveal the linkages between resistance and neo-liberalism. It proposes that a pilot study focusing on the European Union's Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa is a critical case in this regard. It seeks to test the claim that rather than promoting good governance and development, the TDCA is exacerbating an environment that is increasingly hostile to liberal democracy. Since the end of apartheid, a hegemonic project of neo-liberalism has been in progress within South Africa. What this paper adds to the current literature is a discussion of the agency of social forces that may provide resistance to this project. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the practice of multisectoral deliberation within the Global Fund and determine whether it has resulted in providing a more deliberative response to global health priorities. In order to test the relationship between deliberative theory and multisectoral institutional practice, this paper will apply the theoretical arguments for deliberative constitutional safeguards to the results of a four year study on the multisectoral organization The Global Fund to Stop AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. By doing so, the paper will examine whether the multisectoral alternative has been able to increase deliberation and sector participation as well as determine whether it has been able to alleviate the undemocratic power imbalances and G8 centric responses associated with traditional multilateral governance. To do so, this paper will start by outlining deliberative theory and to connect these deliberative principles to the constitutional decision-making procedures and safeguards that underwrite the Global Fund Framework Document. From this connection, the paper will argue that the multisectoralism as practiced by the Global Fund continues to suffer from a deliberative deficit and that it has not safeguarded equal stakeholder participation, equal deliberation between stakeholders or alleviate the asymmetric power relationships which are representative of current forms of G8 driven multilateral governance. By making a link between deliberative theory and the practice of global health governance within the Global Fund, this paper will further argue that traditional forms of multilateral power and influence have corrupted and colonized the deliberation process of the Global Fund. In this sense, the traditional forms of multilateral power and wealth have managed to undermine the constitutional safeguards that were meant to protect equal deliberation and the decision-making process of the Global Fund. By locating various deficits between theory and practice, the last section will briefly outline four possible deliberative safeguards that might, if constitutionally enhanced, pull the multisectoral organization closer to its own normative values as well as toward a more genuine practice of deliberative decision-making. From this, the paper will conclude by exploring the implications involved in using deliberative theory to evaluate deliberative practice and to highlight what insights this research may have on future studies that seek to connect deliberative theory to empirical practice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts of the overall phenomenon, or on empirical studies of distinct institutions that serve to solve particular governance challenges. In this paper we focus instead on the overall "governance architecture," which we define as the overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. Within this larger context, we analyze one aspect that is turning into a major source of concern for observers and policy-makers alike: the increasing "fragmentation" of governance architectures in important policy domains. Increasing fragmentation is prevalent in particular in the current gov¬ernance of climate change, which we have hence chosen as empirical illus¬tration for our discussion. The paper offers a first typology of different degrees of fragmentation, which we describe as integrative, cooperative and conflictive fragmentation. Based on this, we assess major scholarly literatures relevant in this debate—namely cooperation theory, environmental policy theory, and international law—and argue that all literatures offer conflicting statements regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of fragmentation. While we conclude that on balance, fragmentation of global governance architectures brings more harm than positive effects, and that it can generally be seen as a major burden on the overall performance of the system, we also argue that different types of fragmentation have different degrees of performance, and that "integrative fragmentation" might be a realistic second-best option in a world of diversity and difference in which purely universal governance architectures are more a theoretical postulate than a real-life possibility. In the final section, we outline a number of political and institutional strategies to deal with fragmentation of governance architectures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International organizations reflect and promote international norms. Changes in international norms are one source of change in international organizations. But before they become hegemonic at the international level, proto-norms must first gain a foothold at the domestic level. Norm entrepreneurs are seldom able to achieve international breakthroughs without the backing of powerful states that have already been converted. Norms become “internalized” and hegemonic only when they are adopted by many other states that may sign on to them without a strong domestic movement supporting this move. Old domestic “norms”, however, never die. Competing memes (Florini 1996) persist even within key states pushing the proto-norm. Social learning inside the state, even states that push the norm internationally, may be shallower than supposed. Internal actors may temporarily support the norm for reasons of their own, and coalitions can break apart when circumstances change. Eddies of outright resistance remain even when a norm appears to be hegemonic. These provide a latent, receptive audience for those who would challenge a norm. These can link up nationally and internationally resulting in a counter-Boomarang effect. Challengers may draw upon distinctive, competing norms, but as Skowronek (2006) and Lakoff (2006) suggest, they may also challenge a dominant norm by cloaking “old norms” in the discourse of the new. The effect is to “redirect” the norm towards result quite different than that originally intended. In the process, the repute of the norm entrepreneurs is challenged as is their position as interpreters of the norm, weakening the key supporters for the original version of the norm. The outcome of this contest, however, may not be a clear victory for either side. Instead, because the terms of debate are altered, this process may well produce a hybrid of the two competing norms.This paper examines the growing popular challenge to the anti-whaling orientation of the International Whaling Commission, where a majority of states recently (in 2006) adopted a resolution condemning anti-whaling NGOs that have dominated it for twenty years. It examines the eddies of resistance in key anti-whaling states and how these have developed and networked with interests beyond their shores. It focuses on the discourse of those who oppose the blanket moratorium on commercial whaling, looking at how they have portrayed themselves and their opposition, how they argue their case today and what allies they have found. In concluding, the paper will address whether these processes are likely to result in the conversion of key anti-whaling states. Are pro-whaling proto-norm entrepreneurs likely to establish a hegemonic norm of their own, will the process yield a new, hybrid norm or is the historically turbulent IWC fated carry on its precarious existence? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If states are rational, and institutions reflect the will of the powerful, then why do we observe such variation in the design of international organizations? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining several motivations that states, and in particular major powers, have for preferring some institutional design features over others. To this end, the analysis focuses on variation in voting rules across institutions and examines contrasting arguments asserting that voting protocols are avenues through which strong states can institutionalize power or they are ways in which decisions made by international institutions can be self-enforcing. The paper also looks at the importance of other factors such as superpower rivalry and institution size in determining institutional voting rules. To evaluate the role of these multiple factors on voting rule selection, we employ statistical methods and use an original data set of voting rules in a subset of major power intergovernmental organizations. Our main finding is that that voting rules are affected by power considerations when institutions can require policy adjustment by member states and when superpower rivalry is a factor in the institution. On the other hand, we find less support that compliance considerations are important to institutional founders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All human interaction needs some basis for coming to a decision. As the number of participants increases, the problem of making collective decisions increases in complexity. The challenges affect families, cities, countries and international organizations. The long running attempt to create a binding framework for state action to mitigate the effects of climate change shows how hard it can be. This paper examines a more mundane domain than the future of life on this planet, the global trading system, where the periodic "rounds" of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) seem to take longer and longer. The current Doha Round is now in year seven, and a conclusion seems elusive. If international organizations are irrelevant to order and change in the global economy, then explaining this problem is of little interest. I assume, in contrast, that the WTO does matter, though in this paper I square bracket any consideration of the effect the WTO has on its domain, and I sidestep debates about "cooperation". Instead, I engage one aspect of recent debates on WTO institutional design: Is the fact that the Doha Round is conducted as a Single Undertaking a factor that helps or hinders the ability of Members to reach agreement? And I engage one debate about international institutions: Does the Single Undertaking make that difference through its effect on bargaining and/or arguing among Members? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the process of Eastern enlargement rather than its outcome: how and why did the Eastern EU Enlargement happen? The outcome of the integration process is known to everybody - the EU has expanded from 15 members to 25, but the dynamics and the nature of the process itself is less clear. It is suggested in this paper that the concepts of capacities and preferences can provide useful insights when trying to answer the question posed above. In order for any enlargement round to take place it is necessary to reconcile all the existing preferences regarding enlargement. The main argument of this paper is that the preferences of the candidate countries and member states, and their conformity with the institutional and organisational capacities of the EU itself, were among the major determinants of the pace and nature of the Eastern enlargement round. I draw on two basic approaches to the analysis of international organisation - rationalist and sociological institutionalism - to explain the formation of multiple preferences and how these preferences determine the outcomes of the enlargement negotiations. In this regard, I find that rationalist approaches based on cost-benefit assumptions and bargaining theory can provide a better account of diverging member states preferences regarding "terms and conditions" of enlargement, on the one hand, and susceptibility of applicant states' preferences to the influences from the EU, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States as designers of international institutions are concerned about how to monitor compliance. By modeling a situation where inadvertent violations occur probabilistically under asymmetric information, this paper introduces the working of a variety of information mechanisms in international cooperation. Not only the model shows the mechanisms, it also answers two major questions. "Under what conditions external information device foster cooperation?" and "How do those information mechanisms actually work?" I consider information mechanisms in three cases in which states deal with information about compliance with international agreements: (1) complete/incomplete information as base cases, (2) reporting mechanism where communication is allowed between states, and (3) verification agency, an independent body that could produce information on compliance. The model presents a variation of two-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. The key uncertainty is asymmetric information on two sources of non-compliance, opportunistic and inadvertent violations. The situational uncertainty complicates the cooperation process by posing a strategic problem since a player with an informational advantage can exploit the possibility of inadvertent violation and may violate 'opportunistically' in the hope of the other party not sanctioning for its violation. The task of the other party is to cope with the uncertainty in the cooperation environment and to maintain cooperation. I consider how reciprocal enforcement is possible in each information mechanism given such uncertainty about the defection environment. In short, the model examines the value of external information devices in the presence of opportunistic and inadvertent sources of non-compliance. The comparison of each equilibrium condition yields several interesting results. First, exchange of information on compliance does not alleviate the problem of information asymmetry since a player with an informational advantage tries to hide its private information. Second, the verification agency could be an effective enforcement-enhancing device if it achieves the minimum threshold for detecting violations under normal cooperation environment and tries to inform the abnormal situations. Once the agency is equipped with fire alarms to deter defections, it could invest on alerting abnormal situations of inadvertent violations. The threshold differs depending on the size of situational uncertainty, patience level and defection risk. I illustrate the results of the model by examining the development of the WTO dispute settlement systems. The result about the determinants of the verification system potentially explains the transition from GATT to WTO dispute settlement system. I specifically show how the strengthening of the dispute settlement was accompanied by the key situational uncertainty about sources of non-compliance in the face of increasing cases of non-tariff barriers. This paper not only makes a contribution to the field of international cooperation by formalizing the ways that states could communicate compliance information with the focus on the sources of non-compliance, but also contributes to the discussion of the role and development of dispute settlement system under WTO and provides a framework for information systems in other issue areas in international cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because we believe that international institutions matter, we would expect to see institutions raise the cost of non-compliance for states that sign on to the rules. It is surprising that scholars of international relations have not tested whether membership in international regimes and organizations increases the cost for engaging in institutionally outlawed behavior. In this paper, I examine the proliferation of the `democratization clause’, the requirement that member states respect liberal democracy, among regional economic organizations. I find that compliance with the liberal democratic norm is higher within organizations that have the clause. I also find that insider states which broke the norm have been more likely to be punished by outside economic pressure. I conclude that higher compliance with the rule is, at least in part, due to the higher cost of violation to insiders than to outsiders. The study shows that international agreements may have more teeth than their critics give them credit for. We can learn much more about institutions and compliance by studying non-compliance and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reporting on a two year study of 122 projects involving organizations working together to bridge digital divides (gaps in electronic access to knowledge), this paper focuses in depth on a subset of 42 cases where international organizations are partnering with other organizations. Particular attention is paid to knowledge flow within and across communication networks; power equations; and specific roles of international organizations. Analysis of bandwagon effects, similar to institutional theory’s mimetic and normative isomorphism processes, yields implications for communication policy and practice in the context of the dot.com bubble bursting and the changing roles of international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the robustness of the liberal peace proposition by challenging two common practices: pooling data for different geographic regions, and using conflict at any level as a proxy for interstate war. The findings indicate that there are statistically significant differences between regions, and that conflict and war have somewhat different relationships to key variables overall and regionally. Expectations based on some prominent arguments about regionally-specific dynamics appear to be fairly well supported by the results. While I do not argue that these results undermine the general liberal peace proposition, they do represent powerful qualifications that provide insight into its theoretical foundation. They also point to the continuing importance of concepts such as security communities and norms as liberal factors distinct from democracy, economic interdependence, or international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Rational Design Project, as described by Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2000), suggest that progress can be made in explaining the causal evolution of international institutions. One of the areas of empirical interest to the project is the decision-making processes states agree to adopt in the institutions they collectively create (centralization). Building on cases of international organization design and voting system theories (notable the works of Rae, Buchanan, Tullock, and Riker), this paper presents a mathematical analysis of the voting majorities and weighting systems of a large sample of international organizations created after World War 2. Particular attention will be paid to how the method of analysis influences such empirical analyses, as well as question the notion of sovereign equality as a norm of institutional design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On May 1, 2004, ten new member states will join the European Union. However, this new round of enlargement will not be extended to the European Monetary Union (EMU) immediately. But when they do, how will it affect the sustainability and economic performance of the EMU? As we know from International Relations (IR) theory, international cooperation becomes increasingly difficult to maintain as the number of participating states expands. Although the IR literature tells us that hegemony and/or institutions are necessary for ensuring international cooperation, this papers argues that the EMU?s strong and egalitarian institutional setup, not the hegemony of Germany (and/or France), provides the EMU with a high probability of survival and good economic performance in the foreseeable future, whether it counts twelve member states or 25. The argument developed herein is corroborated by the examination of not only the performance of the EMU in its first five years of existence but also by analyzing the sustainability and performance of three other monetary unions created in the post-World War II period: the African CFA Franc Zone, the East African Community, and the East Caribbean Currency Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By introducing the concepts of trade-portfolio and structural potential this paper will offer a sophisticated theoretical approach to analyze and conceptionalize economic power in 21st international relations characterized by mutual interdependence. It will be shown, that the composition of a state's trade-portfolio and its ability to shape the structural context in its favor (structural potentia) are of essential importance its power position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to establish a political framework to mitigate the crisis propensity of power transitions in the international system. One approach that focuses on this phenomenon is the Power Transition Theory originally established by A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. This theory warns that situations in which a (declining) hegemon is approached by rising powers often escalate into conflict or even war. Specifically unsatisfied rising powers are expected to come into conflict with the dominant power and each other. The nature and origin of such dissatisfaction is not spelled out clearly, which remains one the central weaknesses of the theory. Power Transition Theory, we argue, has only a limited view on the structure of the international order. It overlooks the possibility of ruling the system by consensus rather than by coercion, highlighted by Liberal Hegemony Theory. The concept of liberal hegemony by G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan is based on three criteria: "bonding, binding and institutionalized voice opportunities". The partner states are thus part of the system and not mere subordinates. They can influence the institutional rules and do not have to fear the dominance of the hegemon. Merging Power Transition Theory with liberal Hegemony Theory can reveal previously hidden opportunities to manage peaceful power transitions in ways that benefit all members of the international system. Through institutional binding and bonding the hegemon can control the rising powers. Through institutionalized voice opportunities the rising powers have the chance to influence the hegemon, even before they have reached the crucial state of power parity. In the light of the prolonged economic growth of countries like China and India that foreshadows an upcoming power transition, this finding might prove to be crucial for the thinking of future world-order-governance politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key aspect in the dynamics of the "liberal" world order is the crisis of authority over global governance and political economy resulting from the relative decline of "the West". In their quest for sustaining liberalism as a norm and a force in world ordering, the United States and the European Union need to accomplish a strategic shift by making their partnership more effective, and, consequently, by reshaping their leadership role in international relations. Referring to multipolarisation in power structure, eclecticism in institutional governance, crisis in the world economy and finance and ideational confrontation over values, the paper will assess the strategies available for the transatlantic partners for making the necessary adaptations and compromises in what has been an established and successful post-war liberal world order, which is undergoing a post-cold war era of prolonged uncertainty brought about by globalisation and power transitions. The status and strength of liberalism is appraised within four dimensions of international order: power, governance, values and political economy. Despite power transition and the stagnation of the spread of democracy, the Western powers have been able to maintain the core of liberalism in global governance and political economy as the rising powers find absorption into the legacy order beneficial for them. A concluding question remains, whether, as an outcome of choices, or mixing, made by the liberal transatlantic powers among strategies of binding, bargaining, balancing and persuasion, with varying priorities between the goals of performance and redistribution, liberalism will engulf or accommodate the changes underway, or a modified liberal order will take form or a new and different model of world order will emerge in the longer term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the onset of the 21st century, we are left with a world that is more fluid, fragmented and multipolar than ever before. Today we find new patterns of global stratification in which some states, societies and communities are enmeshed in the new global order, whereas others are marginalized. Global governance strives towards de-territorialisation of economic and political power by recognizing the capabilities of diverse groups towards social and political action across the world in the wake of shift in paradigm from nation state to peoples? empowerment. Just as the concept of nation state was designed to conscript citizenship on the basis of equal participation, the concept of global governance is being promoted to contain cultural pluralism, difference and differentiation in the interest of global commons. My paper seeks to focus on the question: is global governance inevitable? Is it desirable too? An attempt would be made to trace the genealogy, causes and consequences of global governance based upon an in-depth study of the actual processes that have led to transnational rule-making and democratic governance beyond the state. It would be further explored: how legitimate and accountable is this? The methodology adopted is analytical, empirical and comparative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance is a vast concept and takes therefore many different forms. One of them is in the form of peace building missions in weak states. While these missions are progressively expanding both their presence and their objectives, there is still clear understanding of to whom these missions should be accountable: to the population of the target state, to the international community, or both? Adding to this confusion is the lack of mechanisms available to verify these missions? accountability. Yet, accountability has somehow become the leitmotif for peace building missions. This paper examines the UN's external peace building missions in Burundi from two different perspectives of accountability through qualitative in-depth interviews with external personnel and local representatives in Burundi. The study argues that although there are means to achieve delegation accountability, the political accountability is one of the first concepts to lose importance when political authority is in transition, firstly because the relationship between the UN and the local actors is unequal and secondly because the UN does not seem willing to change this inequality by according the local actors a wider range of possibilities to sanction the mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International governance of food security has recently been modified by the creation of a High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) on Food Security. One of the initial proposals mentioned the usefulness to establish an IPCC of Food Security, but organizational and political issues led to a configuration that makes the HLPE notably different from the IPCC. It is established in close relationship with the Committee on Food Security, a body linked to FAO and to the UN General Assembly. The experience of IPCC served as a reference point, but also exercises like the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the International Assessment of Agricultural knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), in order to define the rules, mandate and functioning of the HLPE. This paper presents the strategic issues that were dealt with in the constitution of the HLPE, and the first elements of experience of its first months of functioning. Controversies, notably among economists, are at the heart of expertise for food security, when explaining the causes of past food crises or anticipating possible future crises and actions to be taken. The HLPE can serve as a good example of the paradoxical mission of an expertise body that has to deliver a simple, efficient and salient message to decision makers, without trying to escape irreducible controversies among scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My central objective in this paper is to explore a possible relationship between trade interdependence among countries (the main independent variable) and the alignment in multilateral organizations (dependent variable). I will explore how trade interdependence, determines (or not) the same alignment at the United Nations General Assembly. This institution, even though less practical importance that the Security Council, is still a major international decision arena. My main hypothesis is that countries with higher trade interdependence have more incentives to, in general, cooperate with the countries to which they relate at international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can new forms of ‘structured finance’ meet the demands of‘development’ in the global economy? This paper seeks to look at the rise ofprivate market authority in the form of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) andtheir impact on the potential developme ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas indigenous issues had long be considered as being of purely national relevance by most international organizations, the UN began to deal with the topic on a regular basis following the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982. Since then, this institution has cooperated in a very open manner with indigenous representatives. Nonetheless, the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000, consisting of eight governmental and eight indigenous experts who have equal rights, marks an effort to include indigenous standpoints into decision-making processes more directly. It is a remarkable development not only for ethnologists but also for students of IR, considering that the cooperation on an equal footing of governmental with non-state actors implies an important shift in the status of non-state actors in global governance mechanisms. While the paper aims at portraying the recent institutional developments in the treatment of indigenous issues at the UN, it will also present them in the more general context of the creation of inclusive institutions. As many problems are becoming difficult to solve for single nation-states because they are acquiring a global dimension, the new institutions being created to address problem-solving beyond the the nation-state show huge differences with respect to the institutional form and the participating actors. Whereas one can observe a proliferation of diverse institutional forms in general, more specificly there seems to exist a trend towards the inclusion of distinct categories of stakeholders into decision-making procedures at the global level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most profound trends in global governance over the past two decades is the growing extent to which transnational actors have been granted access to international institutions. The source of this development is a subject that so far has received limited systematic attention by international relations theorists. This paper addresses that gap by suggesting three alternative approaches, each offering a distinct explanation of transnational access to international institutions. The first approach privileges concerns about functional efficiency, highlighting the benefits to states and international institutions of engaging transnational actors. The second approach emphasizes concerns about democratic legitimacy, and suggests that we have witnessed the spread of a new norm of what constitutes legitimate governance at the international level. The third approach stresses concerns about power distribution, conceiving of transnational actors as instruments in state competition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I develop a realist-constructivist theory to explain the continued cooperation of the member states within the Lisbon Agenda when this process has largely been unsuccessful in reducing unemployment and increasing social cohesion. The initial genesis of the Lisbon Agenda can be explained by an intergovernmental explanation. Because of their favorable balance of power within the European Council, the most powerful member states determine the direction of the integration process. Additionally, the integration process has been marked by relative gains concerns. The intergovernmental nature of the integration process, with states calculating the relative gains, has becomes a reified, unquestioned part of the European integration. Once the Lisbon Agenda was initially created, the state interests for continued participation has become socially constructed through phenomenological and symbolic interactions. Intersubjective structural processes have generated both European and national identities, which promote interests for continued cooperation that allows for national autonomy. The routinized, habitual interactions among the national elites, as agents, reproduce the Lisbon Agenda as an intersubjective structure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Joseph Schwartzberg proposed a weighted voting scheme as part of an overhaul of the UN Security Council. In our paper, we take Schwartzberg's proposal as a starting point to consider alternative schemes for reapportioning influence in the Security Council. One shortcoming of Schwartzberg's proposal is that he does not consider the problem of relative voting power as opposed to simply defining voting weights (i.e., the percentages of votes held by actors). We first briefly review the various reform proposals that involve changes to the Security Council's decision rules. We then calculate voting weights based on Schwartzberg's "entitlement quotients." We include two formulations of voting weights that differ from Schwartzberg's in how the component measures are weighted. After this, we define several measures of voting power, derived from simple cooperative games, which can be used to assess voting power in weighted voting systems. Results of voting power analyses are then presented. We conclude with an assessment of the limitations of weighted voting schemes for Security Council reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Have small states become more influential in a complex multi-actor governance system, and are there special ways of exerting influence for small states in the EU? According to some scholars small states can become more influential in an international system where sovereignty is under challenge and large multilateral institutions - the EU being the most obvious example - are assuming greater importance. Based on literature about small states in international relations, literature about asymmetric negotiations, and more EU specific literature, I elaborate a theoretical framework and argue that a combination of, firstly, framing; secondly, supplying information within specific issue-areas (with the help of experts); thirdly, striving for norm-compliance and acting as mediators (which is supposedly easier for smaller member states); and fourthly, using institutional opportunities within EU decision-making procedures, contribute to the influence capacity of smaller states. Hence, it is not size per se but the strategic actions of small states trying to promote national interests within an international organization that are interesting. Small states are not necessarily smarter but they have to act strategically - smart - in order to be influential. In addition, small states' experiences as mediators and of negotiating from a weaker position create advantages that large states don't have despite relative voting strength and more material resources. Swedish experiences as Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers and in the transparency area, illustrate the theoretical argument in this paper. These experiences are compared with the French Presidency and French interests, opening up for a wider discussion about size, influence, framing, and political reputation in international cooperative arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance is dependent on factors that are beyond the reach of many contemporary nationstates, including the current hegemon, the United States. Many global issues these governments face have a time span that is multi-generational. Much of the focus of leaders however is on the now. The recent elections in the United States and the war in Iraq illustrate how addicted contemporary governments are to" the now." The rate of temporal change is accelerating and the ability to deal with larger longer scale questions is as of yet undeveloped. This paper argues that contemporary hegemons and would be world leaders must develop new strategies and capacities to manage future time and change. The schedules of leaders worldwide inhibit their abilities to look at longer-term questions. Contemporary international governmental organizations threaten to sink under the weight of their scheduling commitments. Lastly, emphasis on a "just in time" world cripples the ability to look at the longer-term problems. Assessing the temporal dimension of global governance is crucial to further efforts to address many international issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I study the optimal conditioning of international cooperation on domestic outcomes in a political environment with private information and changing domestic circumstances. I address the implications of such incentives for two central aspects of international organization: the optimal structure of cooperation agreements and the empirical pattern of compliance with cooperation agreements. An optimal cooperation agreement between governments that cannot perfectly observe their domestic circumstances reconciles a trade-off between political efficiency of international cooperation and incentives to misrepresent domestic circumstances. The possibility that some governments would misrepresent their domestic circumstances in order to achieve a more favorable cooperation outcome leads to the inability of reaching efficient cooperation outcomes in a range of plausible scenarios. The main theoretical contribution is to establish a new causal link between domestic political transparency and the structure of cooperation rules. When transparency can be measured in terms of the transparency of the political process, this argument implies different contracting opportunities for democracies and autocracies. With respect to the observed compliance pattern of the two regime types, the argument provides a new explanation for why democracies defect from fewer international agreements than autocracies, and why democracies cooperate more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States have increased their international commitments to human rights and democracy norms by legalizing them in prominent regional organizations such as the European Union and the Organization of American States. In these organizations, human rights and democracy norms have become increasingly obligatory through binding legal documents and increasingly precise through the development of new treaties and case law. We explain this development by arguing that interests provide state motives, that decreasing security threats and other events provide opportunities to act, and that preexisting norms help determine which principles will be subject to higher levels of legalization. In particular, governments have functional interests in more credible commitments, policy lock-in, and legitimacy. These interests alone, however, are insufficient to explain legalization and must by synthesized with explanations that focus on systemic opportunities and preexisting norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much does the organizational culture of an international organization (IO) matter for explaining IO behavior? For some theorists, organizational culture plays a crucial role in shaping IO behavior, while for others, organizational culture is an unnecessary and absent variable. However, hypotheses explaining the interaction between organizational culture and other variables such as national preferences remain scarce. To address this gap, I first argue that studies of political culture, strategic culture and bureaucratic politics provide valuable insights for understanding organizational culture in IOs. Next, I demonstrate how the lack of clear hypotheses about the interaction between organizational culture and other variables makes it easier for scholars of IOs to both overestimate and underestimate the causal significance of organizational culture. Lastly, I present thirteen testable hypotheses about the relationship between preferences (both national and domestic) and organizational culture in IOs; and the effects of this relationship on IO behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International organizations are sometimes designed to contrive symmetry, sacrificing policy effectiveness for the sake of preserving a balance of bargaining leverage among member states. When cooperation requires unequal investments in relationship-specific or complementary goods, states will use international organizations to make exemptions for potentially-vulnerable states and to implement institutional mechanisms that privilege the interests of the potentiallyvulnerable members. These may reduce the overall value of cooperation, but are the only way to make cooperation possible in the first place. At the height of its post-WWII predominance the U.S. sought an international system to regulate the spread of nuclear technology, a goal widely shared by allies and adversaries alike, but its initial proposals for a strong supranational authority were rejected. Instead, the compromise that came into being in 1957 as the International Atomic Energy Agency was largely ineffective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation with and even among non-state actors has become a prerequisite for transnational problem-solving. However, disillusionment is widespread. Why does cooperation among international organizations so often remain ineffective? And how do organizations try to overcome these inefficiencies? Recent analyses about dysfunctions and pathologies in inter-organizational cooperation point to a multitude of causes, ranging from turf battles and diverging organizational cultures to bad leadership. In terms of agency, the focus is mostly on international bureaucracies. In contrast, this contribution looks at the behavior of those who task IOs to cooperate, the state principals. I argue that dysfunctional cooperation can result, inter alia, from a control-maximizing approach, which IO member states favor when they design inter-organizational cooperation mechanisms. Member-states tend to cede as little discretion as possible to IO secretariats and staff, insisting on "dual consensus" and delegation to agents closest to member-states in the delegation chain. However, prioritizing control risks undermining cooperation. The resulting effectiveness-control dilemma motivates principals and agents to work around official channels of cooperation, even relying on IO secretariats and staff to do the job principals fail to do. The argument is tested by analyzing the long-standing deadlock of NATO-EU cooperation under the so-called 'Berlin plus' arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even IR scholars who believe international institutions can have independent effects upon state behavior generally dismiss the possibility that international organizations (IOs) possess independent enforcement power because they do not trade, cannot tax, and are unable to conscript militaries. I argue an IO can contribute to enforcing compliance with international norms and rules if it has some autonomy from its state masters and the capacity to punish noncompliance or reward compliance on their behalf. A study of enforcement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime against North Korea by the international community is used to illustrate that the International Atomic Energy Agency independently contributed to international enforcement when it was authorized to do so. This finding has clear policy implications for states seeking to strengthen international cooperation in areas experiencing problems with compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]