Search

The article discusses the 2021 European Meeting on Game Theory (SING16), which is a significant conference dedicated to game theory. The conference received 68 submissions, out of which 28 were selected for publication in a special issue. The accepted papers cover various topics in game theory, including cooperative games, non-cooperative games, dynamic games, and applications of game theory in different fields. The article provides a brief description of the contributions included in the special issue, which range from the study of power indices in voting games to the analysis of supply chain dynamics and the effects of government intervention in green supply chains. Additionally, the article mentions contributions on networks and voting. [Extracted from the article]

To achieve a competitive advantage, corporations are growingly adopting strategies to effectively promote their market demand. Trade credit payment and pricing strategies provided by corporates can efficiently influence customers' purchasing behavior. Although granting a trade credit strategy can increase corporations' market share, such a strategy is a risk-based financing program for corporations. Therefore, corporates should choose whether to use trade credit financing in their long-term. This paper proposes an analytical model to investigate the evolutionary behaviors of retailers regarding pricing and trade credit strategies in the long term. In the study under investigation, retailers can use two financing strategies: risk-based trade credit and non-trade credit (i.e., pricing). This study provides both numerical and analytical findings. Our findings demonstrate that the risk-based trade credit strategy is the stationary financing solution for retailers in the long term. The result indicates that when customers are financially constrained, providing a trade credit scheme to customers is a successful marketing policy in both short-term and long-term frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a distributed computing setting wherein a central entity seeks power from computational providers by offering a certain reward in return. The computational providers are classified into long-term stakeholders that invest a constant amount of power over time and players that can strategize on their computational investment. In this paper, we model and analyze a stochastic game in such a distributed computing setting, wherein players arrive and depart over time. While our model is formulated with a focus on volunteer computing, it equally applies to certain other distributed computing applications such as mining in blockchain. We prove that, in Markov perfect equilibrium, only players with cost parameters in a relatively low range which collectively satisfy a certain constraint in a given state, invest. We infer that players need not have knowledge about the system state and other players' parameters, if the total power that is being received by the central entity is communicated to the players as part of the system's protocol. If players are homogeneous and the system consists of a reasonably large number of players, we observe that the total power received by the central entity is proportional to the offered reward and does not vary significantly despite the players' arrivals and departures, thus resulting in a robust and reliable system. We then study by way of simulations and mean field approximation, how the players' utilities are influenced by their arrival and departure rates as well as the system parameters such as the reward's amount and dispensing rate. We observe that the players' expected utilities are maximized when their arrival and departure rates are such that the average number of players present in the system is typically between 1 and 2, since this leads to the system being in the condition of least competition with high probability. Further, their expected utilities increase almost linearly with the offered reward and converge to a constant value with respect to its dispensing rate. We conclude by studying a Stackelberg game, where the central entity decides the amount of reward to offer, and the computational providers decide how much power to invest based on the offered reward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade, selling to end customers via online channels has played an increasingly important role for the rapid development of e-commerce. Unlike brick-and-mortar distribution channels, the electronic channel can endow e-tailers with more bargaining power over a manufacturer, in particular with respect to setting the wholesale prices. This paper models the strategic interaction between e-tailers, who compete (imperfectly) in the online channel(s) and a monopolistic manufacturer and allows, in contrast to the previous literature, that e-tailers have price-setting power vis-à-vis the manufacturer (who can still decide on which e-tailer(s) to supply. The paper investigates the performance of the manufacturer and the e-tailers in a model that incorporates a vertical variable (the magnitude of a cross-channel spillover between online and offline distribution channels) and a horizontal variable (the degree of e-tailer competition) and allows for a dominant e-tailer structure as well as a dominant manufacturer structure). It considers a two-stage game theoretical model that captures the two key factors and solves for an equilibrium. More specifically, the paper characterizes an equilibrium in the dominant e-tailer structure when the cross-channel spillover is positive and downstream competition is not that strong (as well as in the dominant manufacturer structure). The paper also compares the firms' performances under the two different power structures (dominant e-tailer structure and dominant manufacturer structure) and investigates the magnitude of the e-tailers benefit that is related to a change in their bargaining power. In addition, the cross-channel spillover affects e-trailers' payoffs positively while peer competition has a negative effect on their profits. This paper thus closes a gap as in the literature few papers have focused on the impact of powerful e-tailers on wholesale price decisions and highlight the importance that the e-tailer should take into account both the competition parameter and the cross-channel effect when taking measures that might affect the power structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a supply chain including a farmer, a dairy manufacturer, and consumers is considered in which a particular product is sold through two channels, i.e., formal and informal. In the former, the dairy manufacturer buys the dairy product at a wholesale price from the farmer and sells it to consumers, whereas in the latter, the farmer sells the product directly to consumers. The farmer may add a sort of chemical additive to the product in order to increase its demand in either channel. This may be discovered only if a product safety accident happens. Furthermore, the government, as a regulator, plays an integral role in preventing the production and consumption of contaminated food. We aim to investigate the behavior of players in this supply chain and decide about safety issues and the wholesale price of the product using the game theory approach. To this end, four scenarios, including centralized structure, decentralized structure, cost-sharing contract, and safety guarantee contract, are examined. The experimental results reveal that by enacting appropriate laws, the government can prevent the supply chain players from utilizing unauthorized chemical additives. Furthermore, it is shown that the safety guarantee contract can improve the safety level of the product, which is always at a higher level in the formal channel than in the informal one. It was also revealed that fining the farmer has a greater impact on product safety than fining the manufacturer. Moreover, the farmer has less tendency to use chemical additives when the costs of the product and chemical additives are high or additives pose a high risk to consumers whereas higher product prices tempt the farmer to utilize more additives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online platforms provide sellers' products on their websites and earn a commission fee for each unit sold. Recently, many platforms have tried to refer customers to their direct competitors. In this paper, we explain this counter-intuitive practice by developing a game-theoretic model where two competing platforms contracting with one common seller or two competing sellers. We first analyze a benchmark case where platforms and sellers are integrated, finding that competitor referral will aggregate competition and thus neither platform is willing to refer its competitor voluntarily. However, when each platform serves as a marketplace for an independent seller, it is possible that a platform voluntarily refers its competitor. The rationale is that there exists a double marginalization problem when platforms set commission fees and sellers set prices, resulting in low efficiency of product selling. By referring visitors to their competitors, platforms can introduce cannibalization to cope with the double marginalization problem. We also investigate the case when the two platforms serve one common seller, finding that as long as the seller does not charge discriminated prices for the same product, the platforms may also apply referral. This is because the benefits of the two platforms are more aligned when the common seller sets a common price. Thus, online referral which helps the competitor may also help the referring platform itself. This paper also makes serval extensions to check the robustness of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and price competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is motivated by a real pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) of Valsartan, facing two major concerns. First, implementing effective policies for product recall management due to disruption occurring in the manufacturing process, including impurity in raw material and packaging errors. Second, determining the optimal selling price and quality of raw material affecting the quality of the final compound, Valsartan, due to the effect of these decisions on Valsartan demand. In this paper, we analytically evaluate the impacts of production disruption, defective products recall, and decentralization among the members on the performance of the multi-echelon PSC. Moreover, for the first time, we address the context of channel coordination as a risk-mitigating strategy in case of disruption occurrence by proposing an altered revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, decisions are analyzed comparing decentralized, centralized, and coordinated decision-making structures under a range of scenarios. The results reveal that the proposed coordination scheme not only shares the incurred costs by disruption occurrence among all members but also improves their profitability compared to that of the decentralized structure, which leads to implementing effective recall management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pricing of tickets is a crucial decision when managing entertainment events like concerts, operas, ballets, and theater performances. In this study, we examine the pricing decisions made by two major decision-makers before an entertainment event: the venue and the online retailer. In a game-theoretic approach with uncertain information, the interactions between decision-makers are studied in a single and dual-channel structure. A confidence-level-based uncertainty theory is utilized in order to formulate the amount of uncertainty, and the optimal solutions are analytically computed to maximize the total profit for both players. There are three distinct cases studied, including two single-channel market cases (one in which only the venue sells the tickets, and another in which only the online platform sells the tickets) as well as a dual-channel market case (in which both players sell tickets). Stackelberg and Nash games are used to illustrate the interactions between players in each game. The results indicate the optimal pricing, service level improvement, and total profit for both the venue and the online retailer. Additionally, it is shown that the amount of risk (confidence level) the decision-makers are willing to accept strongly affects the optimal solution. In some cases, the roles of the market participants do not have a significant impact on the optimal solution. The findings of this paper can help practitioners in the entertainment industry make better ticket pricing decisions in an uncertain and competitive environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional research shows that a retailer suffers a loss due to information sharing with a manufacturer in a supply chain. However, when the manufacturer produces both new and remanufactured products, the retailer's trade-offs change. This paper investigates whether the retailer can share demand information with the manufacturer if they can add remanufactured products to the product line. We reveal that the retailer can benefit from information sharing when the manufacturer may remanufacture. On the one hand, if the retailer shares information, the manufacturer utilizes information to strategically adjust wholesale prices, resulting in a reduction in the retailer's profit. On the other hand, if the retailer does not share the information, the manufacturer abandons remanufacturing, leading to a lower profit for the retailer. Therefore, when the former loss is less than the latter, the retailer is willing to share information with the manufacturer. Furthermore, we find that remanufacturing and information sharing can achieve a triple-win situation for the retailer, the manufacturer and the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information asymmetry leads to short-term competitive antagonism between downstream manufacturers and upstream suppliers. This paper applies a master-slave game to reproduce the interest conflict between a manufacturer and a supplier, and proposes a cooperative decision-making model based on information sharing, considering the interest consistency of upstream supply chain members. Additionally, the overall profit coordination mechanism is constructed to ensure the continuation of the cooperative decision-making relationship. In addition, to ensure that the supplier participating in cooperative decision-making has the supply capacity desired by the manufacturer, a rational evaluation system combined with game theory is employed to determine the most suitable participating supplier. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the systematization and effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis, managerial insights and recommendations are obtained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we extend the Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index to the class of dichotomous voting games with several levels of approval in input, also known as (j, 2)-simple games. For previous works, on classical simple games ((2, 2)-simple games), a sensitivity index reflects the volatility or degree of suspense in the voting body. Using a set of independent axioms, we provide an axiomatic characterization of that extension on the class of (j, 2)-simple games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic forced the partial or total cancellation of most sports competitions worldwide. Sports organizations crucially rely on revenues raised from broadcasting. How should the allocation of these revenues be modified when sports leagues are cancelled? We aim to answer that question in this paper by means of the axiomatic approach. Two extension operators (dubbed zero and leg operators, respectively) will play a major role in our analysis. We show that several combinations of axioms (formalizing ethical or strategic principles) characterize the image via those operators of two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In reverse supply chain (RSC) systems, disruptions in the collection process of used items may negatively influence the efficiency of RSC participators. Inspired by a real case study, this paper contributes to the RSC systems coordination literature by analyzing the effect of collection disruptions on the efficiency of an RSC system with dual collection channels using a coordination contract approach. Moreover, this study explores the effect of collection competition between two collection channels (collector channel and remanufacturer channel) on the acquisition prices offered to consumers as incentive schemes for returning the used items. This study determines the equilibrium solutions for selling prices of remanufactured products, acquisition prices, and transfer price under decentralization, centralization, and coordination settings. Additionally, this study incorporates the impact of collection disruptions into the remanufacturer's and collector's problem considering four scenarios. Furthermore, this study proposes a disruption-based two-part tariff contract to accomplish channel coordination in the RSC system with dual-collection channel under collection disruptions. Our finding reveals that the suggested coordinated scheme efficiently coordinates the disrupted RSC with dual collection channels even when under high possibility of collection disruptions. Moreover, our coordination plan is of environmental and economic benefits, as it can boost the return quantities and can increase RSC participators' profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate the optimal advertising strategy for two heterogeneous retailers. To propagandize their products, they have to take the traditional advertising or the targeted one. Then a question appears, what are competitive retailers' optimal equilibrium advertising strategy when they face with differentiated targeted effect consumers? For that, we design four mutually exclusive models: the traditional advertising for two retailers (the 'nn'-model); the targeted advertising for one retailer and the traditional advertising for another (the 'tn' and the 'nt' models); the targeted advertising for both retailers (the 'tt'-model). First, two retailers engage in Nash game to carry out price competitive under the above four models; then they participate in Stackelberg game to carry out advertising strategy competitive under two different game sequences: Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 as the decision leader respectively. By comparison and analysis, some interesting findings are obtained: when consumers' expected targeted effect is positive, both retailers benefit from the targeted advertising, and the weaker retailer benefits more than the stronger; the stronger retailer is better off when he is the decision leader than when his competitor is; when consumers' expected targeted effect is negative and near to zero, its optimal for the dominant retailer to take the traditional advertising and the weaker retailer to take the targeted one; two players get win-win when consumers' expected targeted effect is low or high enough, and they may fall into lose-lose when consumers' expected targeted effect is moderate; consumers and social get higher (lower) welfare under 'tt'-model than under 'nn'-model when consumers' expected targeted effect is positive (negative). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a competition problem in two Pharmaceutical Supply Chains (PSCs) with their exclusive retailer and manufacturer. However, the key to successful manufacturing is not just understanding a Product Life Cycle (PLC), but also proactively managing products throughout their lifetime, applying the appropriate resources and sales and marketing strategies, depending on what stage products are at in the cycle. Providing a competitive pharmaceutical supply chain under a product life cycle and offering Nash and Stackelberg games under the marketing mix strategies (i.e., price, product quality, location, and advertising) and product life cycle (i.e., introduction, growth, and maturity) is a novel idea that needs to be studied. So, a demand function depends on the marketing mix strategies. The competition between PSCs is considered based on the levels of price, quality, access, and promotion (i.e., marketing mix) across different stages of their PLC. Concerning the PLC and the position of a supply chain in a specific period of their PLC, the considered competitions are Nash and Stackelberg. The results of the level of the marketing mix, demand, and profit for each supply chain are obtained by given different games in line with the stage of their PLC. Furthermore, based on investigating the previous annual data, the sensitivity coefficients of the marketing mix of PSCs in the demand function, these coefficients are considered as stochastic fuzzy parameters. Based on the obtained results, the average total profit of the two supply chains in the product life cycle, at Nash equilibrium, is 6.5 times that of Stackelberg. The average total profit of the first supply chain in the product life cycle, at Stackelberg, is 10% higher than Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the average total profit of the second supply chain in the product life cycle, at Nash equilibrium, is 19 times that of Stackelberg. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies remanufacturing cost disruption in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. Specifically, the proposed work compares supplier–remanufacturing and manufacturer–remanufacturing modes with respect to equilibrium strategies and chain members' profits, and analyzes the impacts of different disruption cases on each remanufacturing mode. Stackelberg game is applied to acquire equilibrium pricing decisions of each disruption case and it is found that the manufacturer–remanufacturing and supplier–remanufacturing modes have identical robustness. In manufacturer–remanufacturing mode, when the remanufacturing cost faces negative disruption, the manufacturer prefers to elevate the acquisition price and remanufacture more to improve profitability. In this case, the supplier will set a relatively lower wholesale price of components due to the marketing competition from the manufacturer, and the retailer can obtain more revenues. In supplier–remanufacturing mode, since the remanufactured components may cannibalize new component sales, the supplier will forgo some profits from new components in order to extract more profits from remanufacturing activities only if the negative disruption of remanufacturing cost is large enough. These results can provide a new insight into supplier–remanufacturing with cost disruption in a closed-loop supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the implication of three channel power structures (i.e., manufacturer-led, vertical Nash and retailer-led) on supply chain management in a setting where a manufacturer determines whether to introduce a direct sales channel and a retailer has two capital status (i.e., capital-constrained status or capital-sufficient status). The capital-constrained retailer faces the decision of financing by trade credit or bank credit. We find that compared to cooperating with a capital-sufficient retailer, cooperating with a capital-constrained retailer will make the manufacturer bear a higher encroachment cost. Surprisingly, the capital-constrained retailer choosing trade credit financing may deter the manufacturer's encroachment behavior, which means that trade credit financing has a positive financing effect with manufacturer encroachment. However, bank credit financing always makes the retailer worse off after encroachment, and the positive trade credit financing effect achieves the most efficient performance under manufacturer-led structure, yet remarkably impoverished under retailer-led structure. In addition, although conventional wisdom suggests that the manufacturer will lower the wholesale price to boost retail channel's demand with encroachment, we obtain a different conclusion by demonstrating that manufacturer encroachment has a negative wholesale price effect that the manufacturer will raise the wholesale price after encroachment to ensure that direct sales channel enjoys a price advantage in a Bertrand competition market. Interestingly, we find that retailer-led is the most conducive structure to manufacturer's encroachment, and manufacturer-led is the most unfavorable structure for manufacturer's entry except when the manufacturer cooperates the capital-sufficient retailer in a high-risk market. Furthermore, with the increase of channel competition/market risk/production cost, the manufacturer has less motivation to enter the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capacities are a common tool in decision making. Each capacity determines a core, which is a polytope formed by additive measures. The problem of eliciting a single probability from the core is interesting in a number of fields: in coalitional game theory for selecting a fair way of splitting the wealth between the players, in the transferable belief model from evidence theory or for transforming a second order into a first order model. In this paper, we study this problem when the goal is to determine the centroid of the core of a capacity, and we compare four approaches: the Shapley value, the average of the extreme points, the incenter with respect to the total variation distance and the limit of a procedure of uniform contraction. We show that these four centroids do not coincide in general, we give some sufficient conditions for their equality, and we analyse their axiomatic properties. We also discuss how to define a notion of centrality measure indicating the degree of centrality of an additive measure in the core. Finally, we also analyse these four centroids in the more general context of imprecise probabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study delves into the realm of distribution strategies employed in retail markets, particularly focusing on the widely utilized bundle-and-add-on strategy. Three distinct distribution strategies are examined: bundled-by-the-base-manufacturer (BBBM), bundled-by-the-platform, and the add-on approach within a platform supply chain context. Through comprehensive analysis, this paper investigates the optimal distribution strategy for manufacturers. Significantly, our research reveals that in cases where only bundling is feasible, base manufacturers can reap benefits from a self-bundling strategy when both the platform’s commission rate and the marginal cost of the bundled product are low. Additionally, the platform stands to gain from this approach when the commission rate is low, and the marginal cost of the bundled product is either moderate or very high. Notably, win–win scenarios can emerge for both manufacturers and platforms through specific bundling or platform bundling strategies under specific conditions. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the price of bundles under the add-on strategy will be lower, attracting more consumers, especially when the commission rate is low. Intriguingly, when the marginal cost of the base product is low, the add-on strategy consistently emerges as the optimal choice; as costs escalate, BBBM might be optimal, especially when the commission rate is low, showcasing a nuanced understanding of the interplay between costs and strategic choices in distribution. The major contribution of this paper lies in its nuanced analysis of these strategies and their implications for both manufacturers and platforms in the retail landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasingly wide use of sensor-embedded smartphones, we envision that there will be many crowdsourced logistic companies to acquire logistics service from a large population of carriers. They form a two-side competition market, where crowdsources compete for the limited logistics service and carriers compete for the compensation from crowdsourced logistic company. Each crowdsourced logistic company has to select an "optimal" delivery compensation that can attract enough service providers. Each carrier has to decide which crowdsourced logistic company to join in, while a congested company may resulted in a low reward. In this paper, we present a game theoretic study of such a two-side competition market. To be more practical, we consider the bounded rationality of service providers. We formulate the dynamics behavior of service providers as an evolutionary game, and take two key factors (company's analytics ability and service providers' evaluation) under smart environment in our model, and then present a simulation model for the implementation of evolution process. Through this work, we can understand the dynamic evolution of the medium-sized crowd logistics market under smart environment and crowdsourced logistic company can adjust their strategy to optimal their profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bimatrix games have had theoretical importance and important applications since the very beginning of game theory to date. Pareto optimal strategy vectors represent a reasonable and frequently applied solution concept (basically in the cooperative approach). Particularly, it often arises whether a non-cooperative solution can be improved in cooperative sense, i.e. it is Pareto optimal or not. However, in concrete cases it may be hard to determine the Pareto optimal strategy vectors or at least check the Pareto optimality of a given strategy vector. In the present paper, the Pareto optimality of the strategy pairs in general n × m ( n = 2 , 3 , ... ; m = 2 , 3 , ... ) bimatrix games is studied. First of all an elementary proof is provided for a theorem, which makes the proposed Pareto optimality checking algorithm simpler. Then a nonlinear transform is proposed, which makes the algorithm even more convenient in the important case of 2 × 2 bimatrix games (and for certain other cases). Two numerical examples present the practical applicability of the checking algorithm. The problem of 2 × 2 bimatrix games can be solved even by hand. For larger games, numerous computational tools are available in the practice to apply the checking algorithm in exact or at least approximate way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The object of this paper is to study restricted cooperative games, that is, cooperative games for which the worth of some coalitions is unknown. We consider a value for these restricted cooperative games whose definition is based on the Harsanyi's dividends approach, and can therefore be seen as an extension of the Shapley value. We provide a characterization of this value with three axioms: Carrier, Symmetric-partnership and Additivity, which are similar to those proposed by Shapley (in: Kuhn and Tucker (eds) Contributions to the theory of games, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953). In addition, we characterize this value on the subclass of restricted cooperative simple games. Finally, we apply this value for restricted cooperative games to analyze the power distribution of the Catalonian Parliament in 1980 and compare the results with those of the coalitional value in Carreras and Owen (Math Soc Sci 15:87–92, 1988). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different environmental policies create different incentives for emission reduction. The paper examines the effect of two environmental policies, the emission abatement subsidy and emission tax policies, on a market with manufacturer investment in a green technology to reduce emission. Compared to environmental taxation, the results show that the subsidy policy offers a greater incentive to abate emission and yields higher industry profit. However, regarding social welfare, the subsidy policy leads to lower social welfare and environmental performance than the tax policy when emission is highly damaging to the environment and emission abatement is sufficiently costly. From the industrial perspective, increasing technological efficiency is not necessarily beneficial even if it is costless as the government will adjust the environmental policy accordingly for social welfare optimization, may at the manufacturer's expense. Finally, extensions considering a combined policy (both subsidy and tax), a multiplicative emission cost function, and the problem in a supply chain context are performed to check the robustness of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer sells his digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through a traditional and a digital retail channel. It is assumed that the manufacturer takes a leader role and the retailers follow it. We investigate the contracts that the manufacturer offers to the retailers and our goal is to find the optimal pricing and ordering decisions made by retailers and the best contract that includes maximum profit for the supply chain. Also, we study a numerical example and examine the proposed contracts. On the other hand, in the sensitivity analysis section, we analyze the impact of each parameter of the problem, in particular, the impact of piracy on the profit of supply chain members and decision variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many factors that can inhibit the potential of promising projects from being completely funded in crowd-funding campaigns. In order to study this, a game-theoretical model is constructed to display irrational fear and help creators maximize their chances of facilitating a successful campaign. This research shows that once irrational fear is modeled along with the strategies associated with the design of the reward system, the total pledged amount for a project can be predicted in order to scheme their strategies based on the situation. For simplicity and consistency, the model is based on Kickstarter funding campaigns of physical products that are used as rewards for support. This paper discusses the influence of potential strategies for increasing the total pledge, such as modeling irrational fear and limiting rewards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Circular supply chain management (CSCM) has become an emerging solution against plastic pollution and carbon emission associated with plastic production. This paper develops a three-stage game model to investigate decisions of three critical players in plastic CSCM, including a petrochemical company that produces virgin plastic and faces a cap-and-trade regulation, a multinational company (MNC) with a Scope 3’s emission reduction commitment that sells products in two markets with or without a plastic packaging regulation, and a plastic recycling company that collects and produces recycled plastic. Specifically, the petrochemical company first determines the optimal carbon reduction effort level. The plastic recycling company then determines the optimal price for recycled plastic. After observing the price of recycled plastic and the level of petrochemical company’s carbon reduction effort, the MNC finally determines the optimal proportion of recycled plastic to be used in product packaging. Our results show that the cap-and-trade regulation could encourage the petrochemical company to make greater effort to reduce carbon emission, but possibly lead to a reduction in the use of recycled plastic in packaging by the MNC. Higher plastic fines could incentivize the MNC to use more recycled plastic in the packaging, which is a disincentive for the petrochemical company to make carbon reduction effort. The MNC’s commitment to Scope 3’s carbon reduction contributes to an increased use of recycled plastics, but surprisingly, this results in more carbon emission from the petrochemical company. Interestingly, the total carbon emission of the plastics circular supply chain increases and then decreases as the Scope 3’s commitment by the MNC increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to model the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption by applying game theory. Firms sometimes compete with one another through the bribes that they offer authorities in exchange for special privileges. Provinces are also in competition with another to retain and attract investors. The optimization problem identifies what fraction of revenue is optimal for a bribe so that both firms and authorities can optimize their outcomes. We have proven that corruption is the equilibrium outcome. Notably, the bribe rate as a share of revenue should decrease as firms' productivity enhances, especially for those who are able to relocate to other provinces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this study is to design an optimal managerial compensation scheme and optimal auditor fees to counter income-increasing earnings management behavior. This study draws on game theory with three players: the shareholders, managers and auditors. It considers the possibility of collusion between the manager and auditor and analyzes the different scenarios that may exist between the three players. The results of our study prove that it is possible to establish an optimal managerial compensation contract and optimal auditor fees which will limit earnings management manipulation and guarantee high audit quality. We found that the optimal managerial compensation scheme depends on the firm situation. Moreover, we illustrated how the auditor is motivated by improving audit effort in all possible scenarios. This paper can be considered a tentative effort to provide systematic evidence for designing optimal contracts that align divergent interests between managers and shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empty containers need to be repositioned from a surplus area to a shortage area, and the resulting economies of scope mean that the canvassing (i.e., the sale of transportation service) of two routes back and forth is no longer isolated. To study the liner company's canvassing strategy for round-trip routes, this paper considers a benchmark situation where one forwarder is responsible for two directions and three canvassing sequences with one direction one freight forwarder responsibility. The results indicate that the liner company should focus canvassing on fewer forwarders, and the forwarder should expand service scope. Under one direction one freight forwarder responsibility, it is not necessarily optimal for the liner company that the direction with low potential market demand canvasses first. Examining the preferences of the liner company and two forwarders in terms of canvassing strategy, we find that a triple-win situation can not be formed, but only a win-win situation can be formed between the two of the three participants. Although the canvassing strategy where the direction with high potential market demand canvasses first has the worst effect on balancing cargo flow, it is possible to increase the market share while improving the profit of the liner company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the influence of cascade utilization and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulation on the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries. Three pricing decision models are established under the recycling model of the battery closed-loop supply chain are established in this paper: benchmark model, EPR regulatory model disregarding cascade utilization, and EPR policy model under cascade utilization. Our findings indicate that adopting cascade utilization can boost supply chain profits when the revenue from waste battery recycling is low. However, EPR regulation may dampen the battery manufacturer’s profits and those of the vehicle manufacturer. The third-party collector experiences increased profits when the resource recycling revenue is low, while the energy storage station consistently benefits notably from the EPR regulation. For unregulated battery processing, stricter EPR enforcement is required to achieve better environmental outcomes. During periods of high recycling revenue, EPR regulations can balance supply chain profits and prevent battery manufacturer monopolies. Although both cascade utilization and EPR improve environmental performance, only the former increases consumer welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Factoring business, an important aspect in the supply chain finance field, has significant potential in adopting blockchain-based intelligent contract technology. Based on the existing theories of factoring business in supply chains, this paper conducts a coupling analysis between blockchain technology and supply chain factoring business. Specifically, we propose the application scenarios of blockchain-based intelligent contract technology in the supply chain factoring business from three aspects: the division and transfer of creditors' rights certificate, the factoring financing of upstream suppliers, and the due payment of core enterprises, and elaborate their implementation processes. Furthermore, from a game theoretical perspective, we analyze the mechanism of the key technology implementation of the intelligent contract to verify whether the nodes on the blockchains will follow the relevant protocols to automatically execute them. Finally, we conduct a three-way game analysis of the supply chain factor financing process and obtain an equilibrium solution based on the principle of utility maximization, which highlights the optimization effect of the intelligent contract technology on the decision-making behavior of individual entities in the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To reduce carbon emissions and enable sustainable development goals, electric vehicles need to be promoted. As an evolving area of study, significant research gaps exist in the electric vehicle supply chain literature, especially in terms of competition, game structures, decision variables, green investment, etc. This paper considers two competing electric vehicle supply chains with one manufacturer and one retailer under each supply chain. The supply chain members are profit-maximizing in nature. Here, the manufacturers decide on the wholesale price and green level of the product, whereas the retailers or distributors decide on the retail selling price. The market demand is price-sensitive and also positively related to consumers’ green awareness and brand reputation of green products. Nevertheless, the green level comes with a price in the form of green investment for the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer makes a tradeoff between the increased revenue due to greener electric vehicle technologies and the associated green investments. This paper derived the optimal decisions for the supply chain following three game-theoretical approaches. Three game scenarios represent the dynamic power structures of the market. The overall results are presented via four propositions and twelve corollaries, along with proofs. Furthermore, numerical simulations have been conducted to gain further insights into the sensitivities of the optimal actions with respect to self-price, competitor price, green level, and green investment. The overall study may assist electric vehicle businesses in having a better understanding of optimal pricing and green investment strategies under a variety of market scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the growing environmental concerns and associated health issues of using fertilisers and pesticides in agriculture, Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZNBF) is gaining traction to guide farmers toward sustainable farming practices. Therefore, to promote sustainability and also to safeguard the interests of small farmers who adopt ZNBF, the government in developing economies are adopting two prevalent intervention mechanisms: (i) cost subsidy and (ii) indirect support. However, little has been done to provide clear-cut directives on when to employ these intervention mechanisms, especially in the presence of heterogeneous farmers and yield uncertainty. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a supply chain comprising a government, small farmers, and consumers, and we perform a comparative analysis to understand the prevailing conditions under which a particular policy outperforms another in maximizing social welfare by promoting ZBNF practices. We develop a government-farmer game-theoretic model wherein the government first selects the intervening mechanism to maximise social welfare, followed by farmers’ sowing decisions. Our analysis reveals that both policies positively impact the adoption of ZBNF practices; however, in the scenario of higher environmental damage, cost subsidy outperforms the indirect support mechanism. On the contrary, for medium and lower environmental damage, the choice of intervention depends on the proportion of environmentally conscious farmers. Specifically, the government should extend indirect support only if there exists a critical mass of environmentally conscious farmers. Our findings from analytical and numerical analysis assist the government in identifying and designing the appropriate intervention mechanisms whereas to farmers in their showing decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change and the transition to renewable energy generation have led to unstable electricity supply and demand and soaring prices. In the power industry, spot market is crucial to balance fluctuating supply and demand, while future market can alleviate price fluctuations and coordinate supply chain. This paper compares two general market structures—spot market only versus future and spot market, so as to identify the optimal market structure from government’s perspective. We also investigate power generators’ market targeting strategy and contract choice: wholesale price contract or contract for difference. We find out that the future market can reduce both wholesale and retail prices, increase the amount of electricity, and improve supply chain profits and consumer surplus. To be specific, wholesale price contract is always beneficial for the retailer, but it can hurt generators’ profits in a competitive future market. When spot trading is cost-effective for retailer and future market is less competitive for generators, contract for difference can make retailer worse off and generators better off. By revealing the effects of information structure (i.e., uncertainties of demand and supply cost, inaccuracy of the generators’ signal) and forward contracts on supply chain performance, a regulation method for optimal allocation of renewable energy and non-renewable energy generation is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a pricing decision problem for organic and conventional agricultural products in a food supply chain. This study addresses two general selling channel structures. In the first channel format, both organic and non-organic types of single food agricultural products are offered by an agri-food retailer. In the second channel format, we consider a dual channel agri-food supply chain wherein two selling channels, a retail store and an online selling channel, offer organic and non-organic foods at different prices. This study focuses on designing different distribution channel structures and highlighting their effect on the optimal decisions. The direct selling channel model, centralized dual-channel model, decentralized leader–follower dual-channel model, and coordinated dual-channel with the revenue-sharing contract are designed to analyze the optimal pricing solutions. Several sensitivity analyses are conducted, and different structures are compared. The results reveal that by increasing the compatibility of the product with online marketing, wholesale prices of both organic and conventional products increase. Furthermore, results indicate that the coordinated system suggests higher profits for the retailer, the online store, and the total supply chain compared to other structures. Finally, results drawn from analysis with respect to different parameters are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]