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This paper explores the UK's future Indo-Pacific policy by looking into the newly published Integrated Review (IR) and comparing it with the French and German policy papers. The "Indo-Pacific tilt" is one of the most highlighted themes in the IR, but a reading of the review suggests that the UK remains Euro-Atlantic centered when it comes to defense and security policy. It is only after the internal and external security issues are addressed that the UK pursues its "global interest" through diplomacy and trade. Hence, while the geopolitical and economic importance of the Indo-Pacific is acknowledged, and the stance of the UK towards the region appears more ambitious and confident than that of France and Germany, it remains a question as to the degree to which the UK may commit to the Indo-Pacific. The UK defines China as a "systemic competitor" rather than a "threat," suggesting that while the challenges China poses may be comprehensive and profound, they are not taken as immediate and urgent. This designation is peculiar. On the one hand, it differs from the US policy, which sees China (and Russia) as threats to its national security. On the other hand, compared with the European counterparts, the UK is the only one that calls out China, expressing a stronger will to counter China when necessary. Therefore, it is suggested that the post-Brexit UK is likely to side with the US in the US-China-EU triangular relations. Being very much a middle power, however, the UK's space for maneuver is limited. It pledges to compete against China and seek the latter's cooperation simultaneously, but such a stance requires power and will that the country may be lacking. The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific, for instance, has been described as an expression of the UK's commitment to the rules-based international order. Yet Prime Minister Johnson's emphasis on not antagonizing anyone and the decision that the Carrier Strike Group will not sail through the Taiwan Strait indicates a concern about China and consequently difficulty implementing the "co-opetition" strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis examines the opportunities and challenges facing the United Kingdom (UK) government in building a closer economic partnership with China beyond Brexit. While showing how the goals of each side overlap in key areas of mutual interest, evidence is presented to explain how fundamental imbalances persist in trade and investment relations due to China's economic management system. The authors further argue that political constraints imposed on the UK by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) as economic partners will constrain the British government's room for manoeuvre when negotiating with the Chinese. The analysis identifies potential modalities for achieving some improvement in UK-China bilateral links by drawing on the outcome of the Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement but concludes that political factors will continue to limit outcomes and that a major transformation of UK-China economic relations is not a realistic prospect for the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]